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Notes on Zohn's translation of 
Benjamin's "Die Aufgabe des 
Übersetzers" 
Steven Rendali 
[These notes were not originally intended for publication but for 
presentation as a talk to be given at the Universität des Saarlandes 
(Saarbrücken, Germany) in 1995. They record my reservations 
with regard to Harry Zohn's ground-breaking translation of 
Benjamin's essay, "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers".] 
The most obvious oversights in Harry Zohn's translation 
of "Die Aufgabe" are four rather glaring omissions. One of these 
has been noted by a number of critics : 
...gewisse Relationsbegriffe ihren guten, ja vielleicht besten Sinn 
behalten, wenn sie nicht von vorne herein ausschliesslich auf den 
Menschen bezogen werden." (10) 
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...certain correlative concepts retain their meaning, and possibly 
their foremost significance, if they are referred exclusively to 
man." (70)a 
Here the omission of the negative completely inverts 
Benjamin's meaning, and makes it impossible to follow the logic 
of his argument at this point. De Man, in his commentary on 
Zohn's translation, regarded this omission as particularly crucial 
because it conceals what De Man saw as Benjamin's assertion of 
the inhuman, mechanical operation of language, of the essential 
inhumanity of language. (However, as if to remind us of the 
treacherous ground trod by every critic of translation, De Man 
himself makes a rather egregious error in criticizing Zohn's 
translation of "Wehen" as "birth pangs," arguing that it means 
"pains" of any sort, and that the implicit suggestion of an organic 
origin is improperly imported by Zohn. De Man clearly confuses 
"Wehe" with "Wehen.")1 
A second omission I have not seen mentioned by critics 
occurs later in the essay : 
Wenn aber diese derart bis ans messianische Ende ihrer 
Geschichte wachsen... (14) 
If, however, these languages continue to grow in this manner 
until the end of their time... (74) 
Here Zohn neglects to translate the word "messianisch," and this 
again cannot be considered insignificant, particularly with regard 
a
 I cite the following editions of Benjamin's work : Walter Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser, Werkausgabe (Frankfurt-am-Main : Suhrkamp, 1980); 
"The Task of the Translator," in Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, tr. Harry 
Zohn (New York : Schocken, 1969). 
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to the intense debates about the role of messianism in Benjamin's 
thought in general and in this essay in particular. 
The third omission, which also seems to have passed 
unnoticed, occurs in the crucial passage where Benjamin is 
discussing the "wesenhafte Kern" that is the true translator's chief 
concern, and whose ripening points toward the (messianic) "realm 
of reconciliation and fulfillment of languages" without ever quite 
reaching or realizing it : 
Den erreicht es nicht mit Stumpf und Stiel, aber in ihm steht 
dasjenige, was an einer Übersetzung mehr ist als Mitteilung. 
Genauer lässt sich dieser wesenhafte Kern als dasjenige 
bestimmen, was an ihr selbst nicht wiederum übersetzbar ist. 
(15) 
The transfer can never be total, but what reaches this region is 
that element in a translation which goes beyond transmittal of 
subject matter. This nucleus is best defined as the element that 
does not lend itself to translation. (75) 
In this case, Zohn fails to translate the words "an ihr" and 
"wiederum" in the second sentence, with the result that it seems 
Benjamin is suggesting that the object of the translator's chief 
concern lies completely outside his reach. Although in one sense 
this may be true (as Paul de Man has argued), the point here is 
surely that whatever aspect of the "wesenhafte Kern" is echoed in 
a translation (an ihr clearly refers back to "die Übersetzung" in the 
preceding sentence) cannot be translated again. This presupposes, 
of course, that the wesenhafte Kern can be translated a first time. 
The reason it cannot be translated again — that is, the reason a 
translation of a translation gives no access to this essential nucleus 
of language — is, as Rodolphe Gasché's reading of the essay 
suggests, that this wesenhafte Kern of language consists of 
communicability or translatability itself, that which within 
language exceeds any given use, situation — or "language." A 
translation of the kind Benjamin is defining makes perceptible the 
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element of "pure language" simultaneously hidden and designated 
in the text to be translated — and which is precisely its 
translatability.2 One may find Benjamin's explanation of this point 
in the rest of this paragraph less than wholly clear, but the problem 
is not solved by merely eliding the words that cause it.3 
The fourth omission also seems to have gone unnoticed, 
though it is no less crucial than the first. Benjamin is 
characterizing the traditional view that privileges translation of 
meaning over translation of words : 
Treue und Freiheit — Freiheit der sinngemässen Wiedergabe und 
in ihrem Dienst Treue gegen das Wort — sind die 
althergebrachten Begriffe in jeder Diskussion von 
Übersetzungen. (17) 
The traditional concepts in any discussion of translations are 
freedom and license — the freedom of faithful reproduction, and 
in its service, fidelity to the word. (77-78) 
By overlooking the word "gegen" in Benjamin's text, Zohn makes 
it say precisely the opposite, just as he does by overlooking "nicht" 
in my first example. That this is not merely an oversight is 
suggested by his corresponding elision of the word 
"sinngemässen"; it is traditionally argued, as anyone familiar with 
translation theory stemming from Horace and Dryden would know, 
that literal or word-for-word translation — Wörtlichkeit — is to be 
avoided precisely because it interferes with the transmission of 
meaning. And, of course, by leaving the impression that traditional 
theory endorses Wörtlichkeit, Zohn makes it difficult to understand 
why Benjamin later offers a vigorous defense of this mode of 
translation.4 
Other flaws are less obvious, but some of them seem to me 
equally undeniable. For instance, near the beginning of the essay 
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Benjamin asks whether translations are made for readers who do 
not understand the original, and answers : 
Das scheint hinreichend den Rangunterschied im Bereiche der 
Kunst zwischen beiden zu erklären. Überdies scheint es der 
einzig mögliche Grund, "Dasselbe" wiederholt zu sagen. (9) 
This would seem to explain adequately the divergence of their 
standing in the realm of art. Moreover, it seems to be the only 
conceivable reason for saying "the same thing" repeatedly. (69) 
While it is true that "wiederholt" can often be translated by the 
English adverb "repeatedly," the latter emphasizes the multiplicity 
of the repetitions. It seems clear, in the context of Benjamin's 
argument, that the point is not that the same thing is said "over and 
over," zu -wiederholten Malen, but rather that what has once been 
said is said again — even once again, zum wiederholten Male. This 
can perhaps be related to the omission of "wiederum" noted earlier, 
in that it blurs Benjamin's focus on the relation between original 
and translation(s). — Note also that later in the essay Benjamin 
explicitly says that once a translation has been made into any 
language, it amounts to a translation into all other languages, and 
makes further translations superfluous (because it demonstrates the 
translatability of the text, which is Benjamin's chief concern). 
In addition, Zohn sometimes introduces apparent 
distinctions where there are none in the German text; for instance, 
in the following passage, by substituting "continual" for 
"dasjenige" he suggests a distinction between the Fortleben of texts 
and that of creatures (a distinction Benjamin goes to great lengths 
in this essay to deny, by insisting that when he speaks of the life of 
texts he is not speaking metaphorically), thus tending to send the 
careful reader off on a wild goose chase : 
Und ist nicht wenigstens das Fortleben der Werke 
unvergleichlich viel leichter zu erkennen als dasjenige der 
Geschöpfe? (11) 
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And indeed, is not the continued life of works of art far easier to 
recognize than the continual life of animal species? (71) 
A few lines farther on Benjamin is discussing fame (Ruhm) as the 
form taken by the Fortleben of great works : 
Übersetzungen, die mehr als Vermittlungen sind, entstehen, 
wenn im Fortleben ein Werk das Zeitalter seines Ruhmes 
erreicht hat. Sie dienen daher nicht sowohl diesem, wie schlechte 
Übersetzer es für ihre Arbeit zu beanspruchen pflegen, als dass 
sie ihm ihr Dasein verdanken. (11) 
Translations that are more than transmissions of subject matter 
come into being when in the course of its survival a work has 
reached the age of its fame. Contrary, therefore, to the claims of 
bad translators, such translations do not so much serve the work 
as owe their existence to it. (72) 
Here Zohn takes the antecedent of "diesem" and "ihm" to be 
"Werk," whereas the logic of Benjamin's argument seems to me 
clearly to refer these pronouns to "Ruhm" or at least to "das 
Zeitalter seines Ruhmes." Again, the point is not, as Zohn's 
translation makes it appear, simply the banal assertion that 
"translations that are more than transmissions of subject matter" 
owe their existence to the original work, but rather that they owe 
their existence to the work's fame, to its prestige and to its history. 
Benjamin's argument is frequently harder to follow in 
Zohn's version because syntactical and logical markers are so 
often omitted. As in the case I just cited, where the "former/latter" 
(jene/diese) marker is ignored in Zohn's rendering, in the 
following case the antecedent of the pronoun "dieses"— which in 
the German identifies its antecedent as "das nicht sprachlichen 
Leben"— is considerably less clear in the English version : 
Und zwar ist diese Darstellung eines Bedeuteten durch den 
Versuch, den Keim seiner Herstellung ein ganz eigentümlicher 
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Darstellungsmodus, wie er im Bereich des nicht sprachlichen 
Lebens kaum angetroffen werden mag. Denn dieses kennt in 
Analogien und Zeichen andere Typen der Hindeutung, als die 
intensive, d.h. vorgreifende, andeutende Verwirklichung. (12) 
This representation of hidden significance through an embryonic 
attempt at making it visible is of so singular a nature that it is 
rarely met with in the sphere of nonlinguistic life. This, in its 
analogies and symbols, can draw on other ways of suggesting 
meaning than intensive —. that is, anticipative, intimating — 
realization. (72) 
I also think Zohn mistranslates the first sentence here; den Versuch 
and den Keim are in apposition, alternative formulations; the sense 
is : "And indeed this representation of what is meant by attempting 
to produce it in embryo is a very peculiar mode of 
representation..."; Zohn makes it appear that the Versuch itself is 
keimhaft. The passage is muddied still more by his translation of 
"herstellen" in the preceding sentence as "establish," whereas in 
this one he translates "Herstellung" as "making visible," thus 
effectively masking the logical connection between the two. 
Another case : 
Dagegen kann, ja muß dem Sinn gegenüber ihre Sprache sich 
gehen lassen, um nicht dessen intentio als Wiedergabe, sondern 
als Harmonie, als Ergänzung zur Sprache, in der diese sich 
mitteilt, ihre eigene Art der intentio ertönen zu lassen. (18) 
On the other hand, as regards the meaning, the language of a 
translation can — in fact, must — let itself go, so that it gives 
voice to the intentio of the original not as reproduction but as 
harmony, as a supplement to the language in which it expresses 
itself, as its own kind of intentio. (79) 
I would argue that "in der diese sich mitteilt" should read : "but 
rather as harmony, as a complement to its language in which 
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language communicates itself" The antecedent of the feminine 
pronoun "diese" has to be die Sprache (not Sinn or intentio, as 
Zohn's translation suggests); this seems paradoxical until one 
realizes that it is a precise echo of Benjamin's essay "Über Sprache 
überhaupt und über die Sprache des Menschen," where Benjamin 
insists that language communicates itself — i.e., its nature or 
essence — in and not through language. (Cf. Gasché.) 
And in the same passage : 
Allein wenn der Sinn eines Sprachgebildes identisch gesetzt 
werden darf mit dem seiner Mitteilung, so bleibt ihm ganz nah 
und doch unendlich fern, unter ihm verborgen oder deutlicher, 
durch ihn gebrochen oder machtvoller über alle Mitteilung 
hinaus ein Letztes, Entscheidendes. (19) 
Only if the sense of a linguistic creation may be equated with the 
information it conveys does some ultimate, decisive element 
remain beyond all communication — quite close yet infinitely 
remote, concealed or distinguishable, fragmented or powerful. 
(79) 
This passage seems to me to make better sense if Mitteilung is 
construed not as "information conveyed" but as "(the act of) 
communication." The point here is again, I believe, that what 
language communicates is — to borrow Gasché's formulation — 
communicability; its "meaning" as language is communication 
itself. 
A last example of this sort of problem : in the very knotty 
passage where Benjamin is discussing the emergence of pure 
language out of the mutual "Ergänzung" of different languages in 
translation, Zohn complicates matters further by his translation of 
the following passage : 
Während dergestalt die Art des Meinens in diesen beiden Wörter 
einander widerstrebt, ergänzt sie sich in den beiden Sprachen, 
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denen sie entstammen. Und zwar ergänzt sich in ihnen die Art 
des Meinens zum Gemeinten. (14) 
While the modes of intention in these two words are in conflict, 
intention and object of intention complement each of the two 
languages from which they are derived; there the object is 
complementary to the intention. (74) 
Here Zohn thoroughly confuses the relation between these 
two sentences by melding them. The singular verb in Benjamin's 
first sentence ("ergänzt sie sich") makes it clear that it is the mode 
of intention (not "intention and object") in the two words that is 
"complemented" in the two languages from which they derive. The 
second sentence makes a related but different point — though one 
wouldn't know this by reading Zohn. 
However, the problems are not limited to Zohn's erasing 
or blurring of the logic of Benjamin's argument, which one might 
think particularly important chiefly insofar as we see "Die 
Aufgabe" as a philosophical work. Zohn's translation overlooks 
metaphorical patterns whose significance seems central to 
Benjamin's text considered as a poetic artifact. I will close this part 
of my discussion, therefore, by offering a single (if rather lengthy) 
example illustrating this shortcoming alongside the others I've 
noted. 
My example is drawn from the last paragraph of 
Benjamin's essay : 
Wie weit eine Übersetzung dem Wesen dieser Form zu 
entsprechen vermag, wird objektiv durch die Übersetzbarkeit des 
Originals bestimmt. Je weniger Wert und Würde seine Sprache 
hat, je mehr es Mitteilung ist, desto weniger ist für die 
Übersetzung dabei zu gewinnen, bis das völlige Übergewicht 
jenes Sinnes, weit entfernt, der Hebel einer formvollen 
Übersetzung zu sein, diese vereitelt. Je höher ein Werk geartet 
ist, desto mehr belibt es selbst in flüchtigster Berührung seines 
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Sinnes noch übersetzbar. Dies gilt selbstverständlich nur von 
Originalen. Übersetzungen dagegen erweisen sich unübersetzbar 
nicht wegen der Schwere, sondern wegen der allzu großsen 
Flüchtigkeit, mit welcher der Sinn an ihnen haftet. Hierfür wie 
in jeder andern wesentlichen Hinsicht stellen sich Hölderlins 
Übertragungen, besonders die der beiden Sophokleischen 
Tragödien, bestätigend dar [...] In ihnen stürzt der Sinn von 
Abgrund zu Abgrund, bis er droht in bodenlosen Sprachtiefen 
sich zu verlieren. Aber est gibt en Halten. Es gewährt es jedoch 
kein Text außer dem heilegen, in dem der Sinn aufgehört hat, die 
Wasserscheide für die strömende Sprache und die strömende 
Offenbarung zu sein. Wo der Text unmittelbar, ohne 
vermittelnden Sinn, in seiner Wörtlichkeit der wahren Sprache, 
der Wahrheit oder der Lehre angehört, ist er übersetzbar 
schlechthin. Nicht mehr freilich um seinet —, sondern allein um 
der Sprachen willen. (20-21) 
The extent to which a translation manages to be in keeping with 
the nature of this mode is determined objectively by the 
translatability of the original. The lower the quality and 
distinction of its language, the larger the extent to which it is 
information, the less fertile a field it is for translation, until the 
utter preponderance of content, far from being the lever for a 
translation of distinctive mode, renders it impossible. The higher 
the level of the work, the more does it remain translatable even 
if its meaning is touched upon only fleetingly. This, of course, 
applies to originals only. Translations, on the other hand, prove 
to be untranslatable not because of any inherent difficulty, but 
because of the looseness with which meaning attaches to them. 
Confirmation of this as well as of every other important aspect 
is supplied by Hölderlin's translations, particularly those of the 
two tragedies by Sophocles. [...] in them meaning plunges from 
abyss to abyss until it threatens to become lost in the bottomless 
depths of language. There is, however, a stop. It is vouchsafed 
to Holy Writ alone, in which meaning has ceased to be the 
watershed for the flow of language and the flow of revelation. 
Where a text is identical with truth or dogma, where it is 
supposed to be "the true language" in all its literalness and 
without the mediation of meaning, this text is unconditionally 
translatable. In such case [sic] translations are called for only 
because of the plurality of languages. (81-82) 
I would make two observations concerning this passage : 
First, Zohn's translation erases altogether Benjamin's 
metaphorical opposition between two modes of relation between 
language and meaning : light and flüchtig on the one hand, schwer 
and immoveable on the other. By translating Schwere as 
"difficulty," and Fluchtigkeit as "looseness," Zohn not only 
destroys the opposition between Schwere and Flüchtigkeit, but also 
obscures the logical and metaphorical connection with the earlier 
reference to an "Übergewicht" of information (which Zohn 
translates as "preponderance," further obscuring the metaphorical 
coherence of this passage), as well as with the later reference to a 
"Halten" and to "die Wasserscheide für die strömende Sprache und 
die strömende Offenbarung." (The words "Hebel" and "höher" 
could also be seen as belonging to this metaphorical complex.) 
Second, I would draw attention to Zohn's translation of the 
last sentence of this passage. Benjamin says that in the case of 
Holy Writ, in which alone meaning has ceased to be a 
Wasserscheide separating the flow of language from the flow of 
revelation, the text is unconditionally translatable, "Nicht mehr 
freilich um seinet —, sonder allein um der Sprachen willen." Zohn 
translates this : "In such case translations are called for only 
because of the plurality of languages." He takes the um-willen 
construction as referring to an obligation to translate the text, and 
adds an explanatory phrase not in Benjamin's text, "the plurality 
of," thereby suggesting that Benjamin's point is that only the post-
Babelian plurality of languages makes it necessary to translate 
Holy Writ. 
Now this makes perfect sense, in a way. But I think this 
sentence should be translated quite differently : "Truly, not for its 
own sake, but for that of the languages." That is, I believe here 
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Benjamin is referring back to his claim, in the preceding 
paragraph, that Luther's, Voss's, Hölderlin's, and George's 
translations extended the range of the German language, and to the 
passage from Rudolph Pannwitz quoted at length in the same 
paragraph, which emphasizes that translation can change the 
languages into which the text is translated. This notion goes back, 
of course, to Schleiermacher's 1813 lecture "Ueber die 
verschiedenen Methoden des Uebersezens," which seems to me to 
play a more important role in Benjamin's essay than is commonly 
recognized (also in regard to Schleiermacher's positioning of the 
translator between two languages), though Benjamin has a 
different goal in view : the ultimate, messianic coalescence of 
different languages in die wahre Sprache. As he puts it earlier in 
the essay, "So ist die Übersetzung zuletzt zweckmässig für den 
Ausdruck des innersten Verhältnisses der Sprachen zueinander." 
Finally, I would point out that the metaphorical complex 
I mentioned earlier is inaugurated in the preceding paragraph, first 
by the suggestion that a translation touches the original at an 
infinitesimally small point of meaning or sense, the way a tangent 
touches fleetingly— flüchtig — the circumference of a circle, and 
secondly, by the final sentence of the quotation from Pannwitz, 
which immediately precedes the passage I've been discussing; the 
transformation of languages occurs, Pannwitz says, "nicht wenn 
man sie allzu leicht sondern gerade wenn man sie schwer genug 
nimmt." 
Now, no doubt some would say that the flaws in Zohn's 
translation to which I've drawn your attention are after all minor 
flaws, and hardly worth this much attention. In another case, I 
might be inclined to agree, though it's hard to say just where the 
line between pedantic exactitude and reasonable accuracy ought to 
be drawn. Certainly there are cases where minor errors of 
translation don't matter much so long as the reader is able to "get 
the gist" of the text, to follow the author's "drift," as we say in 
English, or to savor his style and way of thinking. What bothers me 
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in Zohn's translation of Benjamin's essay, however, is that the 
errors seem likely to prevent a careful reader from following the 
argument. This is a particularly serious issue when the text 
concerned is one that is subjected to the kind of intense interpretive 
and critical pressure to which Benjamin's has repeatedly been 
subjected in an English-speaking world that has been depending 
largely on Zohn's translation. Indeed, part of what I want to argue 
here is that "accuracy" remains an indispensable regulative idea in 
translation that should not be abandoned for fear of being called a 
pedant. 
More generally, I would mention two difficulties in 
translating this essay I was unable to resolve to my own 
satisfaction. 
In the first sentence of the third paragraph, Benjamin 
writes : "Übersetzung ist eine Form." Zohn translates this as 
"Translation is a mode." I can see a certain justification for this 
translation, but it creates difficulties when Zohn goes on to 
translate "die Art des Meinens" as "the mode of intention," since 
this seems to suggest that translation is a mode of intention (rather 
than, as I take it, a form or mode of the art work's continuing life, 
or as I argue in my essay, "Translation, Quotation, Iterability," a 
mode of iteration). Should one follow Benjamin in avoiding the 
technical implications of "mode" in both cases, translating "Form" 
as "form" (this has the advantage of being more consonant with the 
vitalist vocabulary that dominates Benjamin's discussion), and 
"Art" as "kind" or "type"? 
The other difficulty is related to this one, and has been 
commented on by De Man, Gasché, and others : how to translate 
"die Art des Meinens"? The chief justification for Zohn's 
translation of "Meinen" as "intention" is Benjamin's use of the 
Scholastic intentio in a similar context later in the essay. One 
wonders, however, why he did not use the German word 
"Intention" here, as he does, for example, in the preface to the 
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Trauerspiel book. I'm rather inclined, for reasons I explain in the 
essay just mentioned, to translate Benjamin's phrase as "mode of 
connotation," though I have not done so in my own translation. 
Notes 
1. "Conclusions : Walter Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," 
in The Resistance to Theory (Minneapolis : University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986), pages 79 and 85. 
2. Cf. Benjamin, "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers" : 
Übersetzung verpflanzt also das Original in einen wenigstens 
insofern — ironisch — endgültigeren Sprachbereich, als es aus 
diesem durch keinerlei Übertragung mehr zu versetzen ist, 
sondern in ihn nur immer von neuem und an andern Teilen 
erhoben zu werden mag. (15) 
3. Perhaps it's worth noting here that, as De Man points out, this 
same passage is also mistranslated in Maurice Gandillac's French 
version of Benjamin's essay. Gandillac has : "Là où le texte, 
immédiatement, sans l'entremise d'un sens [...] relève de la vérité 
ou de la doctrine, il est purement et simplement wtraduisible" — 
schlechthin unübersetzbar. De Man comments — here I'm quoting 
De Man : "what adds some comedy to this particular instance is 
that Jacques Derrida was doing a seminar with this particular text 
in Paris, using the French — Derrida's German is pretty good, but 
he prefers to use the French, and when you are a philosopher in 
France you take Gandillac more or less seriously. So Derrida was 
basing part of his reading on the "intraduisible" on the 
untranslatability, until somebody in his seminar (so I'm told) 
pointed out to him that the correct word was "translatable." I'm 
sure Derrida could explain that it was the same [...] and I mean that 
in a positive sense, it is the same, but still, it is not the same 
without some additional explanation." (De Man, "Conclusions," 
p. 80.) 
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4. The same misunderstanding is reflected in Zohn's translation of 
another passage in which this issue comes up : 
Wenn Treue und Freiheit der Übersetzung seit jeher als 
widerstrebende Tendenzen betrachtet wurden, so scheint auch 
diese tiefere Deutung [i.e., the one Benjamin has just given] der 
einen beide nicht zu versöhnen, sondern im Gegenteil alles 
Recht der andern abzusprechen. Denn worauf bezieht Freiheit 
sich, wenn nicht auf die Wiedergabe des Sinnes, die aufhören 
soll, gesetzgebend zu heissen? (18-19) 
Fidelity and freedom have traditionally been regarded as 
conflicting tendencies. This deeper interpretation of the one 
apparently does not serve to reconcile the two; in fact, it seems 
to deny the other all justification. For what is meant by freedom 
but that the rendering of the sense is no longer to be regarded as 
all important? (79) 
Fidelity is the concept Benjamin has given a deeper interpretation 
that seems to deny freedom any justification — precisely because 
the two concepts have traditionally been regarded as being in 
conflict. Thus Benjamin's second sentence asks rhetorically, 
reflecting the traditional view, "For what can the point of freedom 
be, if not the reproduction of meaning, which is no longer to be 
regarded as normative?" 
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